A friend of mine asked me whether Eve was created with Adam on the Sixth Day, as Genesis 1:27 describes, or after the Seven Days, as Genesis 2 seems to suggest. This question in itself might appear theologically irrelevant, but the implications behind this question are very important for a right understanding of the doctrine of creation and the notion of the Imago Dei, the image of God in which He created humanity.

Genesis 1 is written in a very poetic style. The literary unit (called a “pericope”) begins with 1:1 and ends with 2:3. This unit depicts in broad strokes God’s original creation in the first six days.

Genesis 1:27a and 1:27b say that God created humanity in His image. The word “humanity” or “man” is “ha-Adam“–it is both the name of the first man God created as well as the proper noun for “humanity”. In Genesis 1:27, a definite article is placed before “Adam” (“ha-Adam“), thus it is referring to humanity, albeit with reference to the specific man Adam who is the prototypical human. Note that the word “ha-Adam” does not mean “man” as in male human. Rather, “ha-Adam” means humanity in general. The word for “man,” in contradistinction to “woman,” is “ha-ish,” while the word for “male” is “zakar,” which is used in Genesis 1:27c, “male and female God created them.” Therefore, Genesis 1:27 is not about the creation of the man, the male human, but the creation of humanity, male and female. From this it is clear that God created both Adam and Eve on the Sixth Day.

Genesis 1:27b says, “in the image of God He created him.” This might give the impression that the author is referring to the man. However, the Hebrew word for “him” is just “et + masculine singular ending,” meaning that the action is performed on an object that is grammatically masculine, but the masculine ending does not necessarily indicate that the object is exclusively male. In the context of Genesis 1:27, “him” is practically gender-neutral, since it refers to “ha-Adam,” which is, again, not the male human, but humanity in general.

There are some literary nuances in Genesis 1:27a. It means both that “God created humanity in His own image” and that “God created the human in His own image”. In the former sense, it means that God created humanity in general. In the latter sense, it means that God created the man Adam to be the prototypical human, so in this sense, “ha-Adam” also refers specifically to the man Adam. Yet, God didn’t just create Adam. “Male and female He created them.” That means the creation of Eve was finished on the Sixth Day to mark the creation of a  complete humanity.

In Hebrew, a phrase is repeated with the same words in reverse order to indicate emphasis in a poetic way. Thus we see in Genesis 1:27 two phrases repeated in reverse order of words, “God created man in His own image” and “in the image of God He created him”. A third poetic phrase is employed to stress the completion of the creation of humanity: “male and female God created them”.

The term “male and female” is a Hebrew literary devise known as “merism,” whereby two juxtaposed concepts are joined together to indicate completion and wholeness. For example, “northern Egypt and southern Egypt” means “the whole land of Egypt”. Similarly, “male and female” refers to “the entirety of humanity”. This means that the creation of humanity was completed in entirety on the Sixth Day. After the Sixth Day, the continuation of the creation of humanity only comes in the form of procreation, in the category of divine providence rather than original creation.

The completion of the creation of humanity also marks the completion of God’s original creation of the universe. Genesis 1:1 begins with the merism, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” Now, “the heaven and the earth” is a merism that denotes the whole of creaturely existence. It means “in the beginning God created everything.” The merism denotes the completion of God’s original creation. The completion of the creation of “heaven and earth” is achieved by the creation of humanity, “male and female”. In other words, God’s original creation was not complete until God created Eve. She was God’s very last work in original creation. With the creation of Eve, not only was humanity made whole, but also the universe was made complete. (Note that no such status is given to women in the Koran, even though the Koran tells a similar creation story based on Genesis).

Now, having depicted God’s original creation in broad poetic strokes in Genesis 1:1-2:3, the author moves on to Genesis 2:4-25 and zooms in on the Sixth Day, the creation of humanity. The literary genre shifts from poetic historiography to narrative historiography. This shift in style and genre indicates that Genesis 2:4-25 is not a continuation in the narration of the events in Genesis 1:1-2:3. Genesis 1:1-2:3 and Genesis 2:4-25 are not on a continuous timeline. The events in Genesis 2:4-25 did not take place after the first Seven Days. Rather, the author first depicts the Seven Days in broad poetic strokes in Genesis 1:1-2:3, and then moves on to use a more narrative and less poetic style to explicate the events on the Sixth Day in 2:4-25.

That Genesis 2:4-25 is an expansion of Genesis 1:27 can be discerned from the structural parallels between the two passages. Genesis 1:27 says that God created humanity in His own image, and that the creation of humanity was completed by the creation of the male and the female. The part about the “image of God” in Genesis 1:27 is expanded and explicated in Genesis 2:7-17, while Genesis 2 ends with the creation of Eve as does Genesis 1:27.

In Genesis 2:7-17 we find that the man received life from God’s breath. The breath of God is associated in biblical literature with God’s Spirit. As Calvin puts it, it is the Holy Spirit who “quickens all things”. God gives life through the Holy Spirit. This is not identical to the Holy Spirit’s work of rebirth in believers today. However, there is a parallel between original creation and our new creation in Christ. In original creation, God gave life to Adam by His Spirit, and in one sense the Holy Spirit was present in Adam in a special way, though not in the same way as the Holy Spirit now indwells us to unite us to Christ. In the new creation, too, God gives us new life by the Holy Spirit, and He is ever present in the believer, who is God’s new creation. In original creation, it is through the Holy Spirit that God endows humanity with His image; in the new creation, it is also through the Holy Spirit that God gives us His image in a new way (Eph. 4:24). As we shall see, the core of the image of God in original creation is loving relationality expressed in the union of Adam and Eve, reflecting the loving relationality of the Triune God. In the new creation, too, the new Imago Dei finds its core in loving relationality, thus after having stated that the new man is re-created in the image of God in Ephesians 4:24 in the context of our union with Christ, Paul would draw an analogy between this union and the union between husband and wife in Ephesians 5:22-33. In this way, the new Imago Dei differs from the original Imago Dei in that the new creation is predicated upon our redemptive union with Christ, who is the Mediator between God and humans. Yet, there are parallels between the new Imago and the original Imago as well: both correspond to the inner-Trinitarian relations of love, truth and beauty. Thus Ephesians 4:24 associates the new Imago that God gives to born-again believers with truth, righteousness and holiness.

In original creation as depicted in Genesis 1-2, the specific implications of being endowed with God’s image is that man was able to, in the words of Bavinck and Van Til, “think God’s thoughts after Him.” Even after the fall, man is still de jure and objectively able to do this–fallen sinners still possess God’s image–but he will not because he is in the bondage of sin, and his de facto and subjective inability to do this renders him inexcusable for thinking that he is autonomous and independent of God. The Imago Dei as such means that human rationality and sensitivities are in a way analogous to God’s thought. Man has aesthetic sensitivity (Gen. 2:9) because, as Jonathan Edwards puts it, God is beautiful and God endows His creation with beauty; man has moral sensitivity (Gen. 2:9, 17) because God is holy, and man is called to know the good by knowing God and thinking God’s thought after Him.

The aesthetic and moral sensitivities as a result of humanity’s being created in God’s image is depicted in Genesis 2:8-9, 17. There God made trees that were “pleasing to the eyes”. The aesthetic aspect of the Imago Dei was not just visual, but applied to other senses as well. We are told that these beautiful trees bore fruit that were “good for food”. In 2:9 and 2:17, we also find that God gives a moral command to think God’s thought after Him in order to know and do good. There God placed the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the Garden. The word “knowledge” comes from “yada,” a Hebrew verb meaning “to know” in the sense of “to love,” “to choose,” and “to determine”. To eat from the tree would thus be to declare that humans would autonomously determine good and evil, truth and falsity, beauty and vileness, without thinking God’s thought after God.

Even the act of eating from the tree, however, could not efface the Imago Dei, thus all humans still carry innate moral sensibilities even after the fall. For this reason the de facto and voluntary inevitability for all fallen humans to sin is “without excuse” (see Rom. 1:19-20; 2:12-15). The image of God is such that it makes humans aesthetic and moral beings in His likeness, both before and after the fall.

Then, from 2:15 we also learn that man carries God’s image by possessing governing and working sensitivities. God commands man to govern His creation and be His regent on earth as He is King in heaven; God acts and works, so He commands man to work. This governing and working sensitivity in the Imago Dei also entails rationality: in Genesis 2:19-20 God commands man to study His creation in order to govern it. Adam’s knowledge of God and of all His creation was rational, because God is ultimately rational, and by the Imago Dei endowed to him, Adam thought God’s thoughts after Him.

After the fall, human beings are still rational in one sense, but irrational in another sense. Fallen humans are rational in the sense that they still possess the power to reason, since they are still endowed with God’s image. However, humans have become irrational in the sense that they have fallen into the contradiction of “autonomous reason”. Human reason can never be autonomous; rational autonomy is both an illusion and a reality. It is an illusion because human reason can never escape from God; it is a reality because it refuses to submit to God. In a word, fallen humans have become irrational, because sinners no longer think God’s thought after Him. Even then, we must stress that even fallen humans are rational beings because they are made in God’s image and endowed with the power to reason. This very power to reason, this Imago Dei, renders the irrationality and futility of fallen human thinking inexcusable.

Finally, the Imago Dei involves relationality. God is eternally relational, existing in the loving relations of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Thus God endows humanity with His image of relationality by finally creating the woman in Genesis 2:20b-25. The creation of humanity in God’s image was not complete until God made Eve to be Adam’s wife. The divine endowment of God’s image to humanity was not complete until God created Eve.

Even fallen humans have an intrinsic need for relationships, because we are made in God’s relational image. Yet, since the fall, all relationships in the world have gone wrong. Relationship between God and humans was broken; Adam and Eve began to hide from God. The “bone of my bones” became “that woman”. Relational immediacy expressed in the naked body (Gen. 2:25) was hindered by sin (Gen. 3:7). In a word, relationships in the fallen world are all broken. Even then, however, human beings are still innately relational, because we are made in the relational image of the Triune God. The Imago Dei was never effaced by the fall of Adam, thus in this fallen world we long for love and right relationships. The relationality of the Imago Dei in original creation was expressed when God made humanity in His image, “male and female He made them.”

The image of God in man was completed when Eve was made. Without Eve, all the other sensitivities in the Imago Dei were only partial. Adam could not wholly fulfil the mandate to work and govern the earth with rationality, morality and sense of beauty on his own–he needed a “helper” (Gen. 2:20b). The word “helper” comes from the Hebrew word, “ezer“. The same word is used when the Bible says that God is our “help”. Thus “helper” is not to be misunderstood as “servant”. Rather, to “help” means to complement one’s weaknesses or insufficiencies. That we are told the man needed a helper means that the man was not complete on his own–everything else in creation was already very good (tov me’od!) but it was not good for Adam to be alone. By no means does the word “helper” imply that the wife is subordinate or subservient to the husband, though we are told that according to this order of creation the wife is to submit to the husband–this would pertain to another discussion. Anyway, only with the creation of Eve was the creation of humanity complete. The universe was never whole until the woman was made. Only then was the image of God fully endowed to the human being. Only then was God’s work of original creation complete. Only then did God enter into the Sabbath.

From this we can also see that Genesis 1:27c is linked with the first two phrases in the same verse. The “image of God” in Genesis 1:27a and 1:27b finds its expression in “male and female” in 1:27c. In this sense, the significance of “male and female” with reference to God’s image is not so much the importance of holy matrimony, but rather human relationality that is analogous to the Triune God. More concretely, this relationality is a relation of love. We find, then, that love–agape–lies at the very core of the Imago Dei. The Bible tells us, “We love, because God first loved us” (1 Jn. 4:9). This underpins the meaning of the image of God.

After the fall, our love is just as broken as our relationships, but, once again, the Imago Dei was never effaced by the fall. Thus the Imago Dei renders us inexcusable for not loving God and our neighbours the way the Law commands us. Yet, by the Holy Spirit, God has given us a new Imago Dei, that of our new creation in Christ: “Everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God. Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love. This is how God showed His love among us: He sent His one and only Son into the world that we might live through Him. This is love: not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son as an atoning sacrifice for our sins. Dear friends, since God so loved us, we also ought to love one another. No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, God lives in us and His love is made complete in us. We know that we live in Him and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit. And we have seen and testify that the Father has sent His Son to be the Saviour of the world. If anyone acknowledges that Jesus is the Son of God, God lives in him and he in God. And so we know and rely on the love God has for us. God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in him” (1 Jn. 4:7-16).

This passage from 1 John underpins the meaning of the Imago Dei: to love God’s love after God–”not that we loved God, but that He loved us… we love because God first loved us”. This passage also tells us that the Spirit gives to us a new Imago Dei by uniting us to the Son. Anyone who believes in Jesus as God’s Son possesses this new Imago, and he is once again able to “love God’s love after Him”. What the original Imago can no longer do after the fall, God now gives us a new Imago, the image of His Son, by the Holy Spirit, so that we may love God’s love after Him.

In this way, we see that the new Imago does not abolish or replace the old. Rather, the new Imago completes the old, just as the gospel fulfils and completes the Law. From this we also see that when God created humanity in His image, male and female, the Genesis narrative was already pointing to Jesus Christ.  That God completed His original creation on the Sixth Day and entered into rest on the Seventh means that He shall finish the work of salvation and restore our Imago Dei before our everlasting rest with Him.

From the foregoing discussions we can see that the creation of Eve must reside in the Sixth Day, and not after the Seven Days. Otherwise, God’s original creation would have been incomplete until after the Seven Days (unless one thinks that humanity is complete without the female, that is, without the image of God’s loving relationality); humanity’s image of God would have been incomplete on the Sixth Day; the Sabbath would then have been a day of sloth rather than a day of true rest on God’s part. God rested, because His work of original creation was done. Even though we have fallen into sin and God’s work of redemption is yet to be finished, we can still find rest in God to-day, because we know that He shall sure see to it that He gets the work done before He goes to rest.

God created us in His own image, and, as we have seen, the Imago Dei of the original creation now renders us inexcusable for our immorality, vileness, irrationality, and broken relationships. Yet, the same God who created us in His image has created us again in Jesus Christ, whose incarnate work of mediation is the new Imago Dei. We receive from God new life and this new Imago Dei in Christ by the Holy Spirit, so that the original Imago may be renewed, restored, and consummated. It is this God whom we praise. He is our Triune Creator, and we are made in His image, not once, but twice. His work is finished, and He sure shall finish His work. Praise Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

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As an aside, some Chinese Christians have recently jettisoned a millennia-long Christological orthodoxy handed down from Chalcedon, claiming that Jesus Christ’s humanity is eternal and uncreated, serving as the prototype of humanity and the image of God in which Adam was made. I will not go into the details of why this theory would finally lead to an abandonment of the entire doctrine of salvation taught by the Church since Chalcedon, especially by the Reformation. Suffice it to say here that this theory completely neglects the exegetical details I have provided above on the biblical doctrine of the image of God, confusing the Imago Dei of the original creation with that of the new creation. It also confuses our union with Christ as His work of mediation with His human nature that He assumed in His divine Person upon the incarnation (i.e., this theory confuses Christ’s work with His Person), which was “for us and for our salvation,” as Nicea and Chalcedon put it. The assumptio of human nature whereof Nicene-Chalcedonian orthodoxy and Reformation theology speaks, along with Catholicism, is such that Christ’s human nature is not eternal nor is it inherent to His Person, but rather He assumed it (that is, He took on human nature) in His one divine Person in order to accomplish our salvation from sin. The theory that Christ’s humanity is the uncreated image of God in which Adam was created is both dogmatically and exegetically under-informed and unsound. The Christian leader to whom this theory is attributed only proposed it as a possibility, and it is a possibility that troubles him. Yet, his followers have turned it into a new orthodoxy, jettisoning the entire Nicene-Chalcedonian as well as Reformed orthodoxy, and a lot of them even think that Christ’s “uncreated humanity” is what Reformed theology has always taught! They do not realise that the theory of Christ’s “uncreated humanity” so troubles the leader whom they think they are following, precisely because their leader, who is really my leader and not theirs because they fail to do him justice and are on the brink of turning him into a heretic, knows that this theory is against the universally acknowledged orthodoxy of the Church. This leader is still troubled by the exegetical possibility that Christ’s humanity is uncreated, because he has not yet found the the Church’s orthodoxy convincing. More precisely, he has not read enough about the Church’s decision against such a theory. As a great man whom I most admire, he has humbly asked me to assemble dogmatic materials from Chalcedon onwards to show him why the Church’s orthodoxy has always and universally insisted that Christ’s humanity is created, and why those who even hinted that there is an uncreated aspect to Christ’s humanity, such as Apollinaris and Meister Eckhart, have found their theories condemned as heresies by the Church. I hope those who follow him would learn from his humility and learn from what the Church has been saying since Chalcedon, otherwise their ignorance could posthumously turn this great man into a heretic–he is not!

為什麼神學要歸正？「歸正」並非宗派，凡回歸聖經者，皆為歸正，不論你屬於哪個宗派。神學若不歸正，兩千年來許多毒瘤，終必使巨人變異為妖孽。

這就是為什麼我們要學習「歸正神學」──不只學習歷代聖徒的思想，也學習他們如何歸正，使我們自己也不斷歸正。倘若你只讀聖經，卻不理睬歸正神學，那麼你就很難領悟到「回歸聖經」的訣竅，卻很容易偏離聖經。

於是，宋文勝教授以佈道團名義替我訂了一張機票，兩天後，我在中正機場與唐牧師及佈道團同工碰面，一起飛往雅加達。飛航途中，與唐牧師談事奉、神學、音樂。他讀了我一篇佈道會的講章，給了我一些鼓勵與提醒。我拿出我的 iPhone，他拿出他的 iPod Touch，我們彼此獻寶，分享我們收藏的音樂。空服員發飲料時，唐牧師要了一瓶 Diet Coke，又多要了幾包米果，然後讓我見識到他連吃米果都要應用他的「sqeezism」(用最少資源與時間作最多的事)：他將米果全部倒進杯子，直接跟可樂一起灌進嘴裡。這讓我發現，唐牧師有些東西還真是我一輩子學不來的。

唐崇榮牧師2011.12.22雅加達萬人佈道會

抵達雅加達當天，唐牧師在足球場舉行佈道會，有一萬五千多人參加。參與事奉的同工一絲不苟的態度令我肅然起敬。不論會場布置、影音、詩班、司琴、樂手、指揮、招待、領詩、預備同工飯食的姊妹，都將所有細節作得盡善盡美。就以飯食而論，當天的飯盒都是教會一位姊妹做的，省下從外面訂餐的錢。飯盒有三種：中式炒麵、意大利麵、印尼式套餐。我選了印尼套餐，裡面有七、八道菜，擺飾得跟高級日式便當一樣精緻，美味自不在話下。連預備飯食都如此一絲不苟，我走遍世界這麼多國家，還沒看過自我要求如此嚴格的事奉團隊。

前往佈道會場途中，劉崇右弟兄提出一些解經方面的問題，非常精闢，引發我與唐牧師及他兒子 David Tong 的熱烈討論。談到「罪的歸算」的問題，唐牧師與David合起來跟我辯論。佈道會之後，唐牧師不顯疲態，又因劉弟兄提出的一個問題，與我們一面吃宵夜一面討論基督論，這次變成我與David聯手跟唐牧師辯論。兩場辯論當中，唐牧師說了好幾次：以後的神學講座應該時不時採用這種形式，找幾個神學老師在台上辯論，聽的人受益無窮。當晚唐牧師又說，可惜我們的辯論沒有錄下來，否則可以造就許多人。唐牧師說：「這樣的辯論，很多事情就愈辯愈清楚」(當然，辯論雙方都必須誠懇，不可詭辯)。相比之下，我有一次在公開 email 上跟某位牧師辯論預定論，發給我以前的會友看，結果我以前教會教會兩位傳道就寫信來責備我，說這種辯論只適合神學院，在教會當中不可以辯論神學，會絆倒人。華人教會真悲哀。希望唐牧師開個先例，舉辦給平信徒聽的公開神學辯論會，造就華人教會。

當天佈道會全程用印尼文，David Tong坐在我跟劉弟兄後面替我們翻譯，我估計大概翻譯出佈道信息的九成以上。唐牧師提出的許多論點，跟我當天在飛機上給他看我在紐約佈道會講章的內容，有許多雷同之處，但同樣的內容，從他口裡講出，就帶出一股完全不同的力量，雖經傳譯隔閡，我仍能感受得到。比起他的獅子吼，我的佈道就像貓叫一樣。呼召時，大批人從觀眾席走到球場中間，很難看清楚有多少人，我估計應有上千人。我正因唐牧師的佈道會讓我上了一堂課，又看到這麼多人決志而熱血沸騰時，突然聽到唐牧師在台上講的印尼文中間夾著「Alex Tseng」、「Michael Liu」、「David Tong」。還摸不著頭腦，就被 David 拉到台前，為決志的弟兄姊妹祝禱。有點措手不及，但還是憑著聖靈感動，硬著頭皮用英文在上萬印尼人面前作了禱告。

隔天，十二月23日，唐牧師帶著我及幾位朋友、同工參觀他教會的博物館與音樂廳。說來慚愧，我去印尼之前，一直不太理解他為何要辦博物館，也一直對他收藏藝術品、古董、手錶的嗜好抱持保留的態度。待我親眼見到他的博物館，才明白他的一片苦心。

唐牧師的確用了最少的錢買到最好的收藏品，而這些大部份是用他自己的錢買的，卻全部放在博物館裡面。當我看到館藏中幾十件勞力士、Omega等真品名錶時，我問他：「這些都是您戴過的手錶嗎？」他答道：「我從來不戴名貴的手錶。這些都是買來放在博物館給大家看的。」的確，十餘年來，我每次見到唐牧師，都會注意到他手上的錶，在設計與造型方面很有品味，但都不是名錶。

為何要收藏這麼多名錶，放在博物館給大家看呢？原來，唐牧師看見加爾文主義對瑞士文化的影響，造就了瑞士人對「時間」一絲不苟的態度，使得瑞士鐘錶工藝獨冠全球。唐牧師想讓人們親眼見到這些瑞士名錶，體會歸正運動的精神。多次聽唐牧師在講道中提到加爾文主義與瑞士鐘錶之間的關係，而親眼見到幾十件瑞士名錶擺在那裡，的確具有一種莫名的震撼力與說服力。我想，唐牧師在印尼那一大批同工都如此一絲不苟，肯定與瑞士錶匠的精神同出一轍：歸正精神。

其它館藏也令我大為折服。博物館有一整層樓展示西方藝術。薛華 (Francis Schaeffer) 在《前車可鑑》(How Should We Then Live?) 一書中，援用許多西方藝術史的題材，說明西方文明如何開始認識神又漸漸離棄神。當同樣的藝術史以博物館收藏品的形式活生生地擺在我面前時，那種震撼又與薛華的文字不同。而唐牧師所訓練出來的博物館解說員，都會從基督徒的角度來講解這些藝術品的背景，有很高的護教及福音價值。

博物館圓頂畫

博物館另一層樓展示的是中國文物。唐牧師帶我們參觀這層樓時，由於時間不夠，因此未能詳細解說。但由於我自己對中國歷史稍有研究，我也能從館藏中看出一些福音及護教的信息。譬如，周人敬天，這與周代文物有很大關連；相較於同時期的希臘銅器，周代文物完全沒有怪力亂神之內容。但為何後來福音先傳給了希臘人，而非中國人？為何新約聖經由希臘文寫成，而非中文？我們只能說，這是神主權的揀選以及祂在歷史中間的引導。又或者，從中國山水畫當中我們看到，至少從隋朝開始，中國人就在「自然」當中觀察到某種莫名的超然性。事實上，春秋時代道家、農家，就已發展出這樣的觀察。而宋代朱熹，也用儒家學說來思考大自然當中的「氣」與「理」。這也反應在宋代的一些畫作當中。相比之下，西方藝術在整個中世紀時期，都忽略了「自然」而片面強調「恩典」；中世紀藝術當中幾乎看不見以山水為題材的畫作，都是聖人、聖物、聖經故事、宗教傳統等題材。一直到了文藝復興，西方人才開始為了欣賞大自然而登山，並以山水為藝術題材，但文藝復興對「自然」的欣賞，基本上是與「恩典」脫節的。儘管中世紀經院哲學當中有很強的「自然神學」，但這神學似乎與當時整個迷信式的天主教文化趨勢脫結。到了宗教改革之後，西方文化才發展出真正「普遍啟示」及「普遍恩典」的概念 (這又與阿奎納的「自然神學」非常不同)，人們才真的懂得從自然、日常的事物中看見神的恩典。那麼我們可以問：為何中國人缺乏聖經啟示，卻早看見自然當中的超然性，而西方人受了基督教影響，卻仍如此遲鈍？或者，中國人真的在自然當中看見恩典嗎？又或許他們看到的只是影子，甚至連影子都不是？為何中國人「格物致知」，卻始終對上帝「不知為不知」？這些問題，都可從唐牧師博物館的中國文物館藏當中看出一些端倪，引發我們回到聖經找答案。這博物館，實在是寶貴的福音教材，藉由館藏，把人類受造的尊嚴與墮落後的愚昧，活生生地呈現在我們眼前。

此外，這博物館對印尼人也是很大的文化刺激。音樂廳亦是如此。我聽當地的同工說，整個印尼找不到一間像樣的博物館或音樂廳。從前，印尼人必須出國，才能見識到真正的西方藝術與音樂。唐牧師博物館與音樂廳落成，對印尼人來說幾乎是久旱逢甘霖，讓這心靈貧困的民族得到文化上的滋潤。而重要的是，他們並不是在國立博物館、音樂廳找到這些心靈寶藏，而是在教會！唐牧師的博物館及音樂廳，是跟教會連在一起的。歸正福音運動當中，「文化使命」絕非與福音脫節。

Aula Simfonia Jakarta

在此我想提幾句題外話。最近兩年在溫哥華有一謠言，指稱唐牧師上次在溫哥華，買古董時沒有現金，就請一位姊妹先墊兩千元加幣，事後唐牧師沒還錢就走了，這位姊妹向佈道籌委會抱怨，籌委會從佈道會收到的奉獻當中挪了相等金額補貼這位姊妹，以致許多人被絆倒，認為唐牧師貪戀古董又佔人便宜；本來佈道會的奉獻應該用在事工上，結果卻被唐牧師用來買古董，以公濟私。

這謠言在網上流傳，我看到了，也私下聽教會裡一些人講過。首先，我要替唐牧師澄清，他買古董從不是為了私藏，全是為了放在他的博物館，而去過這博物館的人就知道，這是很有意義的事工。因此，僅管買古董的錢來自佈道會的奉獻，也不可說唐牧師是以公濟私。第二，唐牧師每次到溫哥華，我幾乎都從頭陪到尾，司琴兼任司機。那位姊妹領錢替唐牧師買古董時，我也在場 (唐牧師逛古董時，我都盡量緊跟在他身旁，聽他講解)。我跟這位姊妹很熟，她是一位非常熱心的老教授，很樂意奉獻金錢。當時唐牧師表示會還她錢，可能她出於客氣，說了一句「不用了」。唐牧師說：「那怎麼可以？」之後對話就結束了。或許唐牧師將她的客套話誤以為是她有心奉獻；也或許唐牧師事情很多，不小心把此事忘了。總之，那位姊妹並不打算將那兩千塊作為奉獻，以致產生這些誤會。但唐牧師絕無侵占他人財產的動機，而我自己當時也以為那位姊妹真的要把兩千塊當成奉獻，因為她平時對傳道人真的非常慷慨，也曾經接濟過我。總之，這是誤會一場。我以前也誤會唐牧師建博物館與音樂廳是為了實現自己的夢想。或許這的確是他的夢想，但這與他事奉神的動機並無衝突。親眼見到他的博物館與音樂廳後，我就明白了他的苦心孤詣──這是極俱意義的事工。

參觀完博物館與音樂廳之後，National Reformed Evangelical Convention (NREC) 就開幕了。頭兩天半全都是英文，後兩天半是印尼文，有耳機同聲翻譯英文。參加者來自印尼全國及東南亞許多國家，共約一千五百人。參加英語聚會的，差不多有七百人，我估計他們年齡大多在十八到三十五歲中間。

在印尼這幾天，最令我震撼的大概就是這批參加NREC的精兵。英語聚會其中一堂由David Tong主講范泰爾 (Cornelius Van Til) 的「前設論護教學」。這內容已經很硬了，而 David 講的方式一點也不俯就人，內容緊湊、進度快，舉的例子又都非常學術化。我記得幾年前張康平老師用了五天時間，以最平易近人的方式，深入淺出地在北美歸正學院把這套內容介紹給一群華人菁英知識份子，結果大部份的人還是聽不太懂 (儘管張老師的表達能力是一流的)。David Tong 用一個半小時講完相同的內容，而他的表達又很生硬，我一開始非常擔心聽眾無法吸收。同時，印尼人的平均英文水平不太高，我實在不認為他們能聽懂 David 講的范泰爾護教學。

但David講了大概半小時，我看了看週圍，每個人都很認真地在抄筆記，並未睡著。我當時心想：「大概他們都是所謂『好學生』，雖聽不懂卻仍聚精會神，精神可嘉。」一個半小時過後，這七百多位聽眾仍精神抖擻，而且看起來非常振奮，跟講員有很多互動。我開始疑惑了：「難道他們真的聽懂了嗎？」

這堂聚會結束前，David開放問題解答，讓聽眾將問題寫在紙上，由同工遞上台。出乎我意料之外，聽眾提問非常踴躍，我估計至少遞上超過一百張紙條。我心想：「大概他們很多東西還是沒想通，所以踴躍提問。」我心想他們遞上去的，肯定都是些已經被問到爛的蠢問題。

我完全錯了。David 收到的第一個問題，就令我肅然起敬。David 的專題中提到，基督徒與非基督徒都接受亞里斯多德的「無矛盾律」(Law of Non-Contradiction：命題「P」與命題「非P」不能同時成立)，但基督徒相信此律反應出上帝的永恆與信實，非基督徒則無法解釋此律從何而生。對此，提問者問道：「若基督教世界觀接受『無矛盾律』，那麼我們如何解釋基督的神人二性？」對神哲學史有研究的，都知道這問題有多麼艱深。雖然提問者不一定曉得這問題在神哲學史上的地位，但能夠提出這問題，就表示他不但聽懂了David 的專題，而且看出其中最奧妙的一些關鍵。

接下來的問題更令我吃驚。這問題也跟「無矛盾律」有關，而提問者顯然讀過很多哲學。他的問題大致是：作為基督徒，我們如何回應黑格爾對亞里斯多德「無矛盾律」的批判，以及黑格爾的「logic of mediation」、「negation of negation」、「sublation or Aufhebung」？基督徒若不接受「無矛盾律」，是否就無法正確地將基督神人二性看為超理性的「paradox」？

National Reformed Evangelical Convention

這類的問題，使得半小時的問答時間只夠回答三個問題；本來我以為是David在挑戰聽眾，結果原來是David被聽眾挑戰。難怪他要講得那麼深！我在Regent College、Princeton Seminary讀M.Div. 及Th.M.時，只有最頂尖的學生才有這種程度，能聽懂這類的講座、問得出這類的問題。在牛津，讀神學本科的學生，大部份也沒這種水平。而NREC這些聽眾連神學生都不是；他們只是一群來自全國各地的年輕平信徒。他們的程度，我想西方神學院當中，只有Westminster Theological Seminary訓練出來的神學生能與之相比。我不是妄自菲薄，咱Regent與Princeton的學術要求，跟他們Westminster比，簡直就是幼稚園：不信你自己去看Westminster那些恐怖的課程大綱，以及坐在學校走廊邊那些不用字典直接讀希臘文、希伯來文聖經，用以完成系統神學作業的學生。最近Regent還考慮把M.Div.課程要求從90個學分降到81或72個學分，以減少學生課業壓力。Westminster訓練出來的學生，真的是基督精兵中的「海豹部隊」。想不到在印尼，也藏著這樣一支精銳部隊。

我要強調，我在參加NREC的這群年輕人身上看見的，不只是他們在神學方面勤奮好學。從他們參與事奉、彼此相愛 (我跟他們有很多私下相處的時間) 的態度上，我看見他們活出宗教改革時所強調的基督徒精神：「活在神面前」(Coram Deo)。他們不只認真追求神學知識，在生活的許多細節上，都有敬畏神的樣式。中午領飯盒時，他們彼此禮讓，排隊井然有序；吃完東西丟到垃圾桶，會確定垃圾沒有滿出來。這麼多人吃飯，結束後地上、桌上幾乎看不見一粒飯渣 (至少我一粒都沒看到)。

我在這教會的音樂崇拜中，也看見這種精神。認識我的人都知道，我對崇拜音樂的要求很高。我十九歲開始在唐牧師佈道會上擔任司琴，在這方面對自己的要求非常嚴格。我們教會中有些年輕司琴，很怕我出現在他們司琴的場合，因為我雖然對他們並不苛責，但我對自己的嚴格要求，就使我的出現帶給他們很大壓力。我從前在教會擔任英文堂教牧主任，從來不允許那些對自己沒有要求的人參與崇拜事奉。有人批評我驕傲，但真正驕傲的，是那些外行充內行、不懂裝懂，對自己沒有要求，又想上台的人。他們認為領詩、司琴需要的是「生命」而不是技巧，但他們用破爛的琴藝、荒腔走板的歌喉來事奉神，拖拍、錯音一大堆，卻不懂得羞愧，也不會自我鞭策，得過且過，這正顯示他們多沒生命。這不是恩賜問題，是態度問題。十幾年來站在同樣事奉崗位，都沒有進步，就沒有權利歸咎於自己恩賜不足。恩賜是需要訓練的。加爾文曾說懶惰是罪的根源，這正顯示在這些懶惰的領詩與司琴身上。在我的英文堂當中，懶惰的人是不允許參與崇拜事奉的，因為他們在神面前沒有嚴肅的態度。我訓練司琴的時候，不只訓練他們技巧，我也訓練他們的自我要求。所以每次我回溫哥華時，我從前訓練出來的幾位司琴還會來找我，希望我能幫助他們在琴藝上有新的突破。我在溫哥華擔任教牧時，領詩與司琴也會在週六晚上及週日崇拜前，花很多時間一起練習。到後來我根本不需鞭策他們，他們都自發地嚴格要求自己，甚至有時還反過來要求我花更多時間陪他們練習。嚴肅地活在神面前的人，在崇拜的音樂上應該也是很嚴肅的。

我在唐牧師教會的音樂崇拜中，看到這群人以最嚴肅的態度站在神面前。我所聽到的每一位司琴，在琴藝上都無可挑剔。領詩、合音、司琴之間的配搭，堪稱天衣無縫。據說他們都花很多時間練習配搭。我在那裡五天，每天許多場聚會，從未聽到過領詩或司琴有任何一次走拍。每一場聚會開始前，都有同工帶著會眾一起練習那場聚會要唱的詩歌，儘管手冊收錄的詩歌，都已經是大家很熟悉的。帶領練習的同工，會告訴會眾哪些地方要唱大聲、哪些地方圓滑、強弱如何表達等。會眾也聚精會神地練習。等到敬拜開始，上百上千的會眾唱詩，好像一個大詩班一樣整齊。難得的是，領詩、合音、司琴、會眾 (有時還有室內樂伴奏) 都用心在唱，不是只有技巧，他們真的是發自內心在敬拜神。

從唱詩，到吃飯，到神學，到其它事奉，還有生活中的種種，這教會的同工與會眾都一絲不苟。有人說唐牧師「沒生命」，但「沒生命」的牧師怎能帶領出這樣一間教會？唐牧師是拼上自己的命，嚴肅地事奉神，而他的同工常說：「唐牧師年紀這麼大，還這麼拼命，我們怎敢喊累？」

十二月25日早上，在大堂舉行聖誕主日崇拜。唐牧師講道時，擴音系統突然壞掉。隔了一分鐘左右，仍未修復，唐牧師就以平時四倍的聲量對五千人講道。我自己曾在一間旅館會議室對幾十人講道，麥克風壞掉，我放大聲量講，講完後，呼吸都聞得到自己肺部的血腥味，全身發熱，頭脹欲裂。唐牧師這位七十二歲的老人家，對著五千人講，不用麥克風，像一頭獅子在作困獸之鬥。聽說他後來咳嗽，都咳出血來。(想像一下耶穌行五餅二魚神蹟前，對多少人講了多久的道！)。這讓我想到保羅的話：「我們有這寶貝放在瓦器裡，要顯明這莫大的能力是出於神，不是出於我們。我們四面受敵，卻不被困住；心裡作難，卻不至失望；遭逼迫，卻不被丟棄；打倒了，卻不至死亡。身上常帶著耶穌的死，使耶穌的生也顯明在我們身上。」

離開雅加達前一天，唐牧師臨時更改大會程序，安排我在NREC中主講一篇專題。由於當天都是印尼語聚會，唐牧師就讓我用英文講，他親自擔任我的翻譯。後來他對我說：「你的講道當中還沒有我的這種『火』，所以我替你翻譯，然後就把我的『火』放到你裡面。」我從這位神僕身上，得著太多恩典了。

然而我必須強調，唐牧師只是神的僕人，他不是神。我敬重他，並非盲目地歌功頌德。我上大學時，他曾經是的偶像；我當時雖知他也是罪人，但在我心目中，其實曾經將他偶像化而不自知。我那時認為他的缺點我都看得很清楚，卻覺得那些缺點都無足輕重；當別人對他有些批評時，我的第一反應就是否認那些批評；我當時不容許任何人對他有任何質疑，不論在神學上或人品上。後來我開始自學神學，讀了不少改革宗的著作 (我說「不少」不是誇口──我讀大學時經常翹課，整天泡在Regent College圖書館裡研讀神學)，開始發現唐牧師的講道有些地方跟改革宗主流的說法有出入，譬如他認為聖經當中，基督為聖靈作見證的部份，比使徒、先知為聖靈作見證的部份更有權柄，這違反了一些很重要的改革宗教義；此外他有時引用一些哲學家及神學家的著作時不夠嚴謹，譬如他把羅素反對基督教的論證形容得很愚蠢，但其實羅素的論證還有很厲害的下文，唐牧師卻未說明，我認為這對羅素並不公平；再後來，我跟他私下接觸愈來愈多，我發現他有很多地方真的不是很完美。當然，關於唐牧師的負面謠言也不少，我聽多了，心裡也開始疑惑。

廿三歲那年，我在北美歸正學院看到他，發生了一些事讓我很傷心，甚至不願跟他說話。聽到他在課堂上講了一些觀點，跟改革宗正統有出入，講得卻斬釘截鐵，我當時就打定主意要跟他講清楚。那年歸正學院課程最後一天的分享會上，我站起來當眾對唐牧師的一些神學論點提出疑問，並陳述了我所領受的改革宗神學立場。我發表完後，在場的人都很尷尬，鐵青著臉。

然而，片刻沉默後，唐牧師點點頭、咪咪眼笑得很開心，大聲鼓掌，還帶著大家一起鼓掌，稱讚我幾句之後，對眾人說：「你們不要跟隨我，要跟隨我所跟隨的基督。如果你們發現我講的地方不符合聖經，你們要回歸聖經，不要跟隨我。跟隨我的不是歸正；回歸聖經的才是歸正。」會後，唐牧師還跑來很熱情、慈祥地一直摸我的頭、捏我的臉。這讓我重新發現唐牧師一切可愛可敬的地方。那次之後，我不再把唐牧師當成偶像。所謂偶像，就是當他表現得像神一樣時，你就把他當神一樣供著；當你發現他其實是個「全然敗壞」的罪人時，你就對他失望、把他砸碎。是的，人們對待偶像的方式，不只是崇拜；當我們因著一個人的罪與敗壞而對他失望、傷心，以致棄絕他時，我們其實也是將他當成偶像對待。砸碎的偶像，仍是偶像！我終於不再將唐牧師當成偶像。

當我看到唐牧師的一些缺點，卻比從前更愛他、更尊敬他時，我發現上帝帶領我學習了成聖路程上一門重要的功課。我現在比從前更敬愛唐牧師，心裡常常想念、惦記著他。我比從前更加珍惜、感激他對普世教會──特別是華人教會──一切的貢獻。我深深體會到，神是藉著唐牧師，造就了今天的我；造就了我，微不足道，重要的是神藉著他推動了整個歸正福音運動。我對他這種敬愛、珍惜、感激，跟從前盲目的崇拜，是完全不一樣的。我這幾年研讀神學，同時在世界各地講道、授課、佈道；當我神學鑽研得愈深愈廣、事奉的眼界愈開闊，就愈發體會到唐牧師所發起的「歸正福音運動」的必要性。神將這位僕人賜給教會，絕非偶然。我希望我這一輩的基督徒，都能夠看見神賜給唐牧師的異象，加倍地被感動他的聖靈所感動，在神面前用最嚴肅的態度，尋求信仰上不斷歸正，並把基督的福音傳到地極。

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Hey Alex,

Just today, we had a guest lecturer for my course in modal logic. The lecturer was Prof. N, who is very well known. I found his lecture today extremely interesting as he was attempting to defend a modal logical system called S7.

Basically, the axiom that distinguishes this system is that every statement is “possibly possible”. For example, the Law of Non-contradiction is possibly possible to be false, or contradictory statements are possibly possible to be true. Prof. N notes, however, that the Law of Non-Contradiction is still NECESSARILY true, and contradictions are NECESSARILY false.

What the logic of S7 implies is that although necessary truths and falsehoods still exist, they are still debatable. Prof. N illustrates his point with the concepts of geometry. Indeed, many of the axioms of euclidean geometry are necessarily true; yet, we see mathematicians questioning the necessary truths of euclidean geometry. No doubt, there have been a number of geometrical systems that have sprung up that are incompatible with euclidean geometry, but still useful in their own right.

However, what caught my eye during the presentation was an illustration the professor used regarding the laws of transitivity. Many people would agree that it is a necessary truth that if two things are equal to another thing, then they are equal to each other. Prof. N agrees that this is a necessary truth, but he also argues that it is possibly possible that it is false. To illustrate this point, he mentions the Council of Nicea and the Holy Trinity.

There is something strangely attractive about this logic because it does not abolish all necessary truths and lead us down relativist alleyways; yet, it does not assert that those necessary truths of logic are unquestionable.

To me, I found the existence of such a logic to be quite startling. For a long time, I thought logicians have equated “Truth” with logical truth, and those statements that are illogical or paradoxical would be considered meaningless. This professor, however, seemed to express the opinion that there are many so called “impossibilities” that are possibly true, and that we should explore the possibility of these “impossibilities”.

I found that idea to be quite encouraging as I thought that to accept the paradox of the Trinity, or the paradox of the God-Man duality of Jesus was to alienate myself from all meaningful discourse in analytic philosophy and banish me into the realms of theology.

Because I always thought that any meaningful discourse about God can only take place in a theological context, I seriously doubted that there was any merit in pursuing analytic philosophy. But now that I seem to have stumbled upon a logic of analytic philosophy that not only permits one to talk about the impossible, but encourages one to do so, I find my opinion changing.

What do you think of this logic? Do you think that meaningful discourse about God can take place in an analytic context, or should I just heed Wittgenstein’s advice and “remain silent whereof one cannot speak”

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Hey Frank,

Before I proceed, let me first qualify that I have to know more about Prof. N’s entire philosophical outlook to be able to comment on his thought, since one particular idea must be understood in light of the whole body of ideas if it is to be truly understood.

With this delimitation, I’d begin by saying that I think the particular idea of the “possible possibility” in the modal logical system called S7 is possibly possible. It depends on how the particular idea is used and fitted into a larger body of thought, for I think ideas of logic can never be detached from ontological truths, and the use of logical tools can never be independent of worldview presuppositions. To me, the logic of “possible possibility” can be appropriated for Christian use and interpreted in light of Christian faith, given that it is used with Christian presuppositions.

What appeals to me about S7 is that it seems to distinguish between the subjective and objective sides of truth. For instance, it recognizes geometric theorems as necessarily true in itself, but such objective truths would become debatable when they enter into subjective human minds. If I am right about this distinction between the objective and subjective sides of truth in S7, then I think it comes very close to Van Til’s epistemology. Van Til emphasise that because of the noetic effects of sin, objective truths–though they are necessarily true in themselves–would sometimes appear self-contradictory or debatable to subjective human reason and perception.

Now let’s go back to the discussion on S7. If the notion of “impossibility” in S7 can be reinterpreted in a Van Tilian way in light of the foregoing excursus, then we can understand it as “paradox”. The Trinity and the incarnation are such paradoxes to subjective fallen human reason. In this way, I think S7 may be appropriated for Christian use.

Another thing that intrigues me about S7 is that it seems to have its roots from outside of the Analytic tradition, and that Analytic Philosophy seems to be merely the context in which Prof. N seeks to express his ideas that don’t really belong to Analytic Philosophy.

I am talking about Kierkegaard. The foregoing discussions on objectivity and subjectivity already alluded to his thought. The language of “possible possibility” also sounds very Kierkegaardian. In Kierkegaard’s Sickness Unto Death (1849), the pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus identifies “the decisive thing” for “true hope and true despair” as the biblical axiom “that for God all things are possible.” On the basis of this axiom, he writes: “the decisive affirmation comes only when a man is brought to the utmost extremity, so that humanly speaking no possibility exists. Then the question is whether he will believe that for God all things are possible—that is to say, whether he will believe.”

Anti-Climacus states: “Sometimes the inventiveness of a human imagination suffices to procure possibility, but in the last resort, that is, when the point is to believe, the only help is this, that for God all things are possible.” Similarly, “salvation is humanly speaking the most impossible thing of all; but for God all things are possible! This is the fight of faith, which fights madly for possibility.”

In Kierkegaard’s writings, Anti-Climacus’ take on the notion of possibility is complementary to that of Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard’s other pseudonym, set forth in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). The short section on possibility bears the long title, “The dialectical contradiction that what is historical here is not something plainly historical but formed of what can be historical only against its nature, accordingly on the strength of the absurd.” In this title Climacus is referring to the paradox of the incarnation: “the historical is that the god, the eternal, has come about at a definite moment in time as a particular human being. The special feature of the historical in this case, that it is not something plainly historical but something that can have become historical only against its own nature, has ushered speculation into a delightful illusion.” The incarnation is thus an “absolute paradox”.

Asserting that the absolute paradox cannot be directly understood by human reason, Climacus proceeds to discuss the notion of “possibility.” Note that unlike Anti-Climacus who talks about “impossibilities” in terms of human limitations and “possibilities” in terms of divine omnipotence (“for God all things are possible”), when Climacus uses the word “possibility,” he is always referring to what humans can do within the limitations of human capabilities. Climacus writes: “Actuality, i.e., the fact that this or that has actually occurred, is the object of faith and yet is surely not any human being’s or humankind’s own thoughts, for thought is at most possibility, while possibility as understanding is precisely the understanding by which the step backwards is taken in which faith comes to an end.” Climacus explains that “Christianity is the absolute paradox… precisely because it destroys a possibility (the analogy of paganism, an eternal god-becoming) as an illusion and turns it into actuality, and just this is the paradox…, which, just by being actuality, turns the apparent into a deception.”

For Kierkegaard, Paganism is a possibility of human imagination, in which “God can very well be fused with man.” Yet, this possibility–which Karl Barth in the Second Edition of the Epistle to the Romans (Romans II) would call the “supreme possibility” of humankind–is destroyed by the actuality of the absolute paradox, namely, that the incarnation “should occur in actuality with an individual human being.” In a word, for Climacus (as well as the Barth of Romans II), faith in the paradox of Christianity is not within the category of human possibility. Barth would combine Climacus’ insight with that of Anti-Climacus, and say that faith and revelation are impossible in this world, but God almighty makes them possible. Even then, says Barth, faith and revelation remain “impossible possibilities” in this fallen world.

Kierkegaard’s discourses on “impossibility” and “possibility” are in fact central to Barth’s dialectic in Romans II. For Barth, knowledge of God through Christ is humanly (i.e., subjectively) impossible, and it is only because all things are possible with God that faith becomes an “impossible possibility” for human beings. Barth’s emphasis, however, is on the “impossible”–God has made revelation and faith possible in this world but they shall remain ever impossible such that humanity can never have true or constant possession of God’s self-revelation in this world of time and history. This dialectic of an “impossible possibility” undergirds Barth’s entire Romans II.

I don’t know if Prof. N ever read Kierkegaard or Barth at all. Some of his language, ideas and examples sound strikingly similar to these thinkers, and I think he is at least influenced by Kierkegaard to a large extent.

That means we have to be careful when we adopt Prof. N’s logic and language. We must not go down the road that Neo-Orthodox theologians have once trodden. Even Barth himself dropped the language of “impossible possibility” two years after the publication of Romans II, when he picked up the doctrine of the Holy Spirit’s works in Reformed orthodoxy. Barth found that the Holy Spirit can work in the believer’s heart to create faith, and thus subjective human receptivity of God’s objective revelation in Christ becomes a reality rather than an impossible possibility. The pathetic thing about Barth (during the 1920s and all through his career) is that he did not carry through with his Pneumatological insight. Under Kant’s shadow, Barth still insisted that revelation cannot be given to humans as constant possessions, thus rejecting the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of Scripture. We must ask Barth, If he believes that the Holy Spirit really creates faith in the believer in the here-and-now, how is it that he would not allow the same Holy Spirit to inspire prophets and apostles to verbally write down God’s Word so that the Word is given to the Church once and for all in the here-and-now? And if Barth believes that the historicity of the incarnation is permanent, how is it that the Holy Spirit’s work in the here-and-now cannot also be permanent?

Now I have ventured a bit too far off our topic. I am only issuing the caveat that Prof. N’s basic ideas have already been adopted by theologians in the past. In the case of Barth, these ideas have failed miserably: without the doctrine of inerrant verbal plenary inspiration Barth was never able to “laugh in the face of Feuerbach” as he once vowed to (something you’ve heard from me numerous times). Yet, I think Prof. N’s basic ideas can also be appropriated in a Van Tilian way.

The second caveat is that if we are to remain truly Christian in using Prof. N’s basic ideas, then we have to be very careful about his suggestion that “we should explore the possibility of these ‘impossibilities,’” as you put it.

From the Christian standpoint, the Trinity and the incarnation are our axiomatic presuppositions. We cannot deduce a priori whether they are possible or not. These truths are the starting point of our quest for knowledge; they are not the goal of this quest. Thus, we have to be very careful about what it means to “explore” the “possibility” of our worldview presuppositions. If by “explore” we mean to prove by deduction or induction, we would commit the fallacy of what Heidegger calls onto-theology once more. Our project must not be a metaphysical exploration in the sense of deducing the possibility of Christian truths from First Principles. We can only “explore” the worldview implications of the fundamental truths of Christianity, much like the way mathematicians explore their geometric axioms by using the axioms to deduce or prove their theorems.

This leads to your question, Is a truly Christian philosophy possible at all? Does philosophy not have to find its starting point on neutral grounds, in universally acknowledged truths, in First Principles? Well, I think such an understanding of philosophy is certainly outdated. Postmodernism (to use a very general and imprecise term) has its merits in showing that there is no such thing as “neutrality” in this world. Existentialism tells us pretty much the same thing as well with its discourse on “subjectivity”. From a Van Tilian standpoint, there is no “neutrality” in this world because we are all sinners. Our reason is either redeemed or unredeemed. We either think God’s thoughts after God, or we follow our intellectual idols. Everyone person holds to a set of worldview presuppositions. Now, in our so-called “postmodern” age, it is no longer considered a fallacy to find one’s starting point in certain presuppositions. Quite the contrary, the claim of neutrality is often considered intellectually dishonest in this day and age. A philosopher does not have to and indeed cannot start from neutral grounds without presuppositions. Thus, in this day and age, you would be able to expressly hold to a Christian worldview and still be considered a true philosopher.

What is the task of a Christian philosophy, then, if it is to be distinguished from theology? I think philosophy should be the handmaid of theology. Theology is to explicate the contents of revelation and formulate doctrines; philosophy is to find its starting point in these doctrines and “explore” a whole range of implications. For example, what are the implications of the doctrine of justification for a truly Christian epistemology? What does the biblical doctrine of creation tell us about political ethics? I think such are the questions to be explored by truly Christian philosophers.

One final caveat: we must not use Prof. N’s idea of “possibility” as the pagan notion of probability. Classical apologetics has ended up in a situation in which they can only show that God’s existence is highly probable. When Eve was in the Garden, she also saw God’s Word as a possibility that was more probable than the serpent’s words. That was an act of practical atheism: Eve placed herself above both God and the serpent to judge which was right, and she came up with her own verdict.

If “possibility” is understood in this way, then a philosophy seeking to demonstrate the “possibility” of Christian truths can never be truly Christian. If the word “possibility” is only meant to describe the subjective uncertainty of (fallen) human reason, which I think is what Prof. N is doing, then it is fine. However, this word can still be very misleading, and I would be very careful in using this terminology. I would never say to an unbeliever, “Look, Christianity is a possibility. Let’s now explore this possibility.” I would say instead, “Look, your non-Christian worldview, be whatever it may, is a possibility. Let me now show you how absurd this possibility is–not just how improbable it is but how qualitatively impossible it is.” Then I would say to the unbeliever, “Now, I find my starting point in the biblical worldview with certainty. Look what I’ve discovered about this world in which and over which Christ is Lord forever!” This, I think, is the task of Christian apologetics, which goes hand in hand with Christian philosophy.

有位讀者回應了我的上一篇關於自由戀愛的文章，提出了一個問題：以斯拉和以色列人離棄他們的異教配偶是否正確（見以斯拉記9～10章）？以下我將說明：（1）根據律法，和異族通婚確實是罪；（2）律法從未要求猶太人離棄異教配偶；（3）以斯拉和上帝立約，製造出上帝啟示之外的宗教條例，這一行為是法利賽人律法主義的根源。

在以斯拉記9～10章中，作者以旁白方式明確指出，猶太人和異族通婚是罪（如以斯拉記10：19）。而且，以斯拉在他的講話中引用了出埃及記7：3（見以斯拉記9：12），表明禁止與異族通婚不是人為捏造，而確實是出於上帝的律法。在以斯拉記第9章的開頭，清楚說明那一時期盛行的異族通婚不是發生在猶太民族和外族之間，而是猶太教徒和異教徒之間。的確，此類的異族通婚在新約（參見哥林多後書6：14）和舊約中都是罪。

我們必須清楚：猶太民族和外族人之間的異族通婚從未被禁止。路得和喇合都是外族人，上帝也在救恩歷史中使用她們作為恩典的器皿。觸犯上帝律法的是與異教徒通婚。如果說在出埃及記中僅僅是隱約表達了這個意思，那麼在士師記3：6中引用出埃及記7：3的經文，則表達得更加明顯：以色列人犯罪，不是因為他們嫁娶了外族的男女，而是因為他們與異教通婚，“並侍奉他們的神”。同樣的情形發生在以斯拉時代，因此以斯拉訴諸於上帝的律法，以禁止與異教通婚，同時代表他的百姓向上帝悔改。到目前為止，一切都很好。

問題在於以斯拉想要和上帝立約（10：3）。而這個主動與上帝立約的動機恰恰是完全出於異教。上帝是立約的主；上帝和人類立約。上帝採取主動。上帝決定立約的條款。假使以斯拉是先知，上帝也許會通過他給出祂的約；以斯拉或許得以先知性地宣告上帝和以色列的約。但事實並非如此，以斯拉不是先知！以斯拉是祭司！先知發聲，是從上到下，從神到人；祭司發聲，則是從下到上，從人到神。以斯拉最多是作為文士，宣告神已經通過先知給出的律法，但他本身從來就不是先知（見尼希米記8章）。當上帝沒有主動立約的時候，以斯拉越權主動和上帝立約。決定此約條款的不是上帝，而是以斯拉。因此，此約註定錯誤。

那麼就條款內容而言，此約的錯誤何在？的確，根據上帝的律法，與異教通婚是罪。但是上帝的律法是否要求猶太人離棄他們的異教配偶？聖經中從來沒有這樣的要求！當然，休掉異教妻子也沒有違反律法。出埃及記24：1說，如果發現妻子有不潔的事，人可以休妻；這裏不潔的事當然包括拜偶像在內。然而，律法對此類離棄僅僅是允許；律法並未要求甚或贊同！

律法從未要求猶太人離棄異教配偶，儘管在某些情況下這種離棄可能是討神喜悅的。然而，以斯拉在這裏製造出一個出於自己而不是出於上帝的約，要求猶太人離棄他們的異教配偶。他認為自己是敬畏神的。是的，敬畏神是討神喜悅的；但是過分的畏懼和過度的反應是得罪神。以斯拉所做的本質上和夏娃所做的相同：上帝僅僅是說，“不可吃”，但是夏娃自己給上帝的話加上了一個要求，“不可吃，也不可摸”。那不是聖潔；那是褻瀆。是律法主義。是倚靠自己而非倚靠神。

關於以斯拉人為之約的論述還可補充一些內容。此約的詳細內容可在尼希米記第10章中找到，該章以一句話結束：“這樣，我們就不離棄我們神的殿”。褻瀆！他們不是祈求上帝不要離棄自己，而是發誓不離棄上帝！這本當是上帝的臺詞，正如祂曾對約書亞說，“我必不撇下你，也不丟棄你”（約書亞記1：5）。約書亞所有該做的和可做的就是仰賴上帝可靠的恩典。而以斯拉時代中這些放肆的原始法利賽人，他們僭取了上帝的聲音，“仁慈地”對神說，“我們不離棄祢”！

在所有的認罪行為之後，他們並未表現出對罪本質的理解。他們表現出的，是對恩典真意的完全忽視。他們不明白上帝恩典的主權和主權的恩典；他們不明白自己不過是罪人，需要仰賴上帝的恩典，才不致墮落。他們沒有把上帝的律法看成討神喜悅的完備指南，而代之以自己的聲音，“我們又為自己定例來討你喜悅”（參見尼希米記10：32）。這不就是創世記第3章的重現！

是的，這就是律法主義猶太教——所謂“第二聖殿猶太教”——時期的開始。以斯拉此處所做的——僅僅是這位在其他方面堪稱神偉大僕人的一個小小敗筆——成為了法利賽主義的根源。

現在，如果你看以斯拉記第10章（本書作者是什麼人並不影響這個問題，因為關鍵在於內容是受聖靈所默示），作者——聖靈——從來沒有讚賞以斯拉和他百姓與上帝的立約。作者也沒有在此說上帝悅納這個人造的約。書中沒有說上帝喜悅猶太人離棄他們的異教配偶。整本聖經也沒有告訴我們，上帝因這些人的離婚而赦免他們。

你不能通過主動和上帝立約而得到赦免。你甚至不能通過遵守祂的約而買到神的恩典。你之所以不能，是因為你是一個全然墮落的罪人。你永不可對上帝說，“我將永不離開你，也不離棄你。”相反，你應該對祂說：”我深知道心易放蕩，遠離父家慕虛華。” 然後再求祂：“今獻身心求加印記，永作主民在父家。” 因為你只能信靠耶穌基督，祂一次並永遠地成為你的義，你的罪歸為祂的罪。只有在祂裏面靠著祂，你才能蒙神喜悅。只有當你通過聖靈與祂聯合，你才能確信上帝永不撇下你，也不丟棄你。定睛仰望耶穌，不要注視自己。

In Ezra 9-10, the author clearly indicates in the authorial voice that intermarriage between the Jews and pagans was a sin (e.g. see Ezra 10:19). Moreover, in his speech Ezra cites Deuteronomy 7:3 (see Ezra 9:12), showing that the ban on intermarriage was not artificially invented, but was indeed God’s Law. At the beginning of Ezra 9, it is stated explicitly that the intermarriage prevalent during that period was not between Jews and Gentiles, but between Jews and PAGANS. Indeed, such intermarriage would be a sin both in the Old Testament and the New Testament (Cf. 2 Corinthians 6:14).

We have to be clear: intermarriage between Jews and Gentiles was never forbidden. Ruth and Rahab were both Gentiles, and God used them both as vessels of mercy in the history of salvation. It is marriage with Pagans that violated God’s Law. If this is only implicit in Deuteronomy, then Judges 3:6, using the wording of Deuteronomy 7:3, makes it very clear that the Israelites were sinful not because they married gentile men and women, but because they married pagans “and served their gods”. The same situation was occurring in Ezra’s time, and so Ezra invoked God’s Law to ban intermarriage with pagans, while at the same time offering up repentance to God on behalf of his people. Up to this point, everything is good.

What went wrong was Ezra’s proposal to make a covenant with God (10:3). The very move of taking the initiative to make a covenant with God was completely pagan in itself. God is the Lord of the Covenant; God makes His covenants with men and women. God takes the initiative. God sets the terms of the Covenant. Were Ezra a prophet, God might have given His covenant through him; Ezra might have prophetically proclaimed God’s covenant to Israel. But no, Ezra was no prophet! Ezra was a priest! A prophet speaks with a voice from up above to down below, from God to men; a priest speaks with a voice from down below to up above, from men to God. Ezra was at best a scribe who proclaimed a Law that had already been given through the prophets, but he was himself never the prophet (see Nehemiah 8). Ezra went out of his place and made a covenant with God, when God did not take the initiative to make that covenant. God did not set the terms of that covenant; Ezra did. Therefore, this covenant was doomed to go wrong.

So what went wrong with the covenant, in terms of its content? Well, yes, intermarriage with pagans is a sin according to God’s Law. But did God’s Law require the Jews to divorces their pagan spouses? Such a requirement is nowhere to be found in the Bible! Of course, divorcing pagan wives was not against the Law either. Deuteronomy 24:1 says that a man is allowed to divorce his wife if he finds in her anything unclean, and sure that would include idolatry. Yet, the Law only PERMITS such a divorce; the Law does not REQUIRE or even ENDORSE it!

The Law never required Jews to divorce pagan spouses, though in particular cases such a divorce might have pleased God. Yet, here is Ezra, conjuring up a covenant of his own that did not come from God, requiring the Jews to divorce their pagan spouses. He thought he feared God.  Yes, the fear of the Lord pleases God; but unduly fear and over-reaction are sinful. What Ezra did was essentially the same as what Eve had done: God only said, “Do not eat,” but Eve added one requirement to God’s Word, “Do not eat, and do not touch”. That is not holiness; that is blasphemy. That is legalism. That is to rely on oneself rather than relying on God.

One more thought might be appended to this discourse on Ezra’s man-made covenant. The detailed content of this covenant can be found in Nehemiah 10, which ends with the phrase, “We will not forsake the house of our God.” Blasphemy! Instead of asking God never to forsake them, they vow never to forsake God! This was supposed to be God’s line, just as He once said to Joshua, “I will never leave you nor forsake you” (Joshua 1:5). All Joshua had to and was allowed to do was to rely on God’s unfailing grace. Yet these presumptuous proto-Pharisees in Ezra’s time–they assumed the voice of God and “graciously” said to God, “We will not forsake you”!

After all the confessions of their sins, they showed no understanding of the essence of sin. They showed complete ignorance of the meaning of grace. They failed to know God as the graciously sovereign and sovereignly gracious God; they failed to know themselves as sinners who could only rely on God’s grace to prevent them from falling away. Instead of trusting in God’s Law as their fully sufficient guide to pleasing God, they said to God, “We made ordinances for ourselves to please you” (Cf. Nehemiah 10:32). This is Genesis 3 all over again!

And yes, this was the period in which legalistic Judaism–so-called “Second Temple Judaism”–began. What Ezra did here–just a minor blunder in the life of an otherwise great servant of God–became the very seed of Pharisaism.

Now, if you look at the text of Ezra 10 (the human authorship is of no concern for this particular matter, as the crucial point is that this text is inspired by the Holy Spirit), the Author–the Holy Spirit–never did once praise the covenant that Ezra and his people had made with God. Never once does the Author say in Ezra 10 that God was pleased with the man-made covenant. Never once does this text say that God was delighted when the Jews divorced their pagan spouses. Never once does the Bible tell us that God had forgiven these people because of the divorce.

You don’t gain forgiveness by making a covenant with God. You can’t even purchase God’s grace by keeping His Covenant. You can’t, because you are a sinner, totally depraved. You must never say to God, “I will never leave you nor forsake you.” Instead you should say to Him, “Prone to wander, Lord, I feel it, prone to leave the God I love.” And then you can beg Him, “Here’s my heart, O take and seal it, seal it for the courts above.” For you can only trust in Jesus Christ who once and for all became your righteousness as you became His sin. He is the One who kept the Covenant for you and in you, as you were chosen in Him. Only in Him and through Him can you ever become pleasing to God. Only as you are united to Him by the Holy Spirit can you have assurance that God will never leave you nor forsake you. Fix your eyes on Jesus, not yourself.

先從第二、三點談起。所謂「聖經時代」指的是什麼？如果指的是猶太人被擄之後又歸回耶路撒冷開始的那個時代，那麼的確，當時文化相當歧視「自由戀愛」。但我們必須明白這時代的背景。這個時代，猶太人從被擄的經歷中學到了教訓，不敢再違背神的律法，但他們過猶不及，於是有了法利賽式的律法主義。許多事情是律法並未禁止的，但到了這個時期，都被猶太人自己定的律法禁止。譬如，被擄之前，猶太人與外邦人通婚，本無律法禁止，而且非常普遍，只要娶來的外邦人願意歸信耶和華，都可蒙神喜悅。亞哈娶耶洗別遭神厭惡，不是因為耶洗別是外邦人，而是因為她拜巴力、不敬畏耶和華。但敬畏耶和華的外邦人，如喇合、路得，不但蒙神喜悅，嫁入以色列，甚至成為大衛的先祖。然而，到了被擄歸回的時期，以色列人自定律法，不允許猶太人與外邦人通婚，因此撒馬利亞人遭到猶太人的歧視。撒馬利亞人是猶太人與外邦人通婚後的混血族群，他們也是敬畏耶和華的，但只因他們不是純種猶太人，就被猶太人視為不潔淨。耶穌在井邊與撒馬利亞婦人談話，等於是賞了猶太人兩個耳光，駁斥了他們的律法主義。

綜觀聖經歷史，所謂「聖經時代沒有自由戀愛」，也只適用於這個被擄歸回之後的時代。在此之前，雅各與拉結、路得與波阿斯，都是自由戀愛，並未遭到責難。雖然從亞伯拉罕開始，由父母安排婚姻乃是常態 (譬如以撒跟利百加)，但聖經律法從未禁止過自由戀愛。

再論「自由戀愛」與文藝復興的關係。事實是，自由戀愛在中世紀已經很普遍，從遊唱詩人的歌曲中就可見得。此外，中世紀文學大多以宮廷及宗教為題材，其中也不乏自由戀愛的故事。有一位反對自由戀愛的神學導師說，自由戀愛「都是莎翁惹的禍」，這是錯的。莎士比亞只不過將戲劇文學平民化，使之雅俗共賞。在中世紀，可登大雅之堂的文學都以宮廷及教會為題材；平民文學是不登大雅之堂的。文藝復興之後，平民的愛情故事也成為了經典文學。但不論中世紀或文藝復興，自由戀愛的故事都為人津津樂道，儘管父母指定的婚姻仍是社會常態。這就說明，自由戀愛並非人類新時代的新發明。且不論中世紀，早在舊約時代，自由戀愛就已存在，而且可以蒙神喜悅。

最後來討論「聖經沒有戀愛觀」理論的第一個論點──聖經並無關於戀愛的律法與教導。極端改革宗的這個論點，反應了他們的一個預設立場：他們認為，聖經說可以作的，我們才可以作，而聖經如果沒有說可以作，那我們就不能作。這立場並不符合聖經本身的教導。加爾文討論「基督徒的自由」 (Christian liberty) 時，引用林前六12、十23，提出「凡事都可行」，只要律法沒有禁止的，我們都可以作。同樣地，利未記多處提到「耶和華所吩咐不可行的什麼事」(參利四-五)，舊約聖經也多處提到有人犯了神所吩咐不可行的事 (例王下十七12)，但從來沒有說有人因作了耶和華未允許也未禁止的事而觸犯祂。簡言之，聖經的原則是，只要神沒有禁止的，我們都可以作。這就是「基督徒的自由」。

聖經有許多關於婚姻的規範，譬如婚姻乃是一男一女、婚姻以外的性行為都是姦淫等，這就讓我們看見，神設立的婚姻是神聖的、特殊的，有許多規範。你不能在這規範之外，尋求另一種婚姻；你不能去找個同性的人結婚；你不能在配偶之外找第三個人一起上床。

聖經關於婚姻的規範，當然也影響到婚前的戀愛，譬如婚前不能與對方同居。但除此之外，聖經並未直接設立關於戀愛的律法。這就代表，戀愛的方式有很大的彈性。當然，有些方式比較有智慧，有些方式比較危險，但只要不違反聖經，那麼都可行。網戀、遠距戀愛、相親，都可行。有人選擇婚前不接吻，有人在婚前就很親密，但沒有在肉體上犯罪，這些也都可行。有人一進入戀愛就馬上委身，有人要先作朋友或以「開放關係」的模式交往，以免太快委身會變成「走在神前面」：或許後者更有智慧，但前者也非不可行。正因聖經沒有禁止婚前戀愛，也沒有直接規範婚前戀愛的模式，所以婚前戀愛是很自由的。

然而，「基督徒的自由」還有一個重要的原則：「凡事都可行，但不都有益處。」保羅的原則是，我們在所行的事上要以討神喜悅為首要目的，在此前提下藉所行之事造就人(參林前十)。此外，保羅還說：「凡事我都可行，但不都有益處。凡事我都可行，但無論哪一件，我總不受他的轄制」(林前六12)。所謂「轄制」，在聖經中總是與「罪」、「仇敵」等概念放在一起；在「轄制」之下，人無法自由地敬拜神、以神為生命的主宰。如此，戀愛可以很自由，但假如戀愛成為轄制你的偶像、讓你無法在生命中以神為中心，那麼你就得罪神了。此外，如果你的戀愛不造就你自己、不造就對方、不造就教會與眾人，那麼你的戀愛也不能討神喜悅。談戀愛的過程，應該讓基督徒更親近神、更成為眾人的祝福，因此，聖經說「你們與不信的原不相配，不可同負一軛」，這原則也適用於婚前的戀愛──戀愛應該是兩個信神的人共負一軛來榮神益人。

此外，戀愛是非常自由的，但神知道人在自由當中就容易犯罪，所以神雖未如規範婚姻那樣用律法來規範戀愛，但神用許多基督徒處事的基本原則 (也就是所謂「世界觀」)來引導基督徒的戀愛。例如，聖經教導神的預定與掌管，以及基督徒應該如何明白神的心意、如何區分神「隱藏的旨意」與「顯明的旨意」(參申廿九29)。這是很大的課題，在此不贅，但總之，明白這課題，就能夠將其應用在戀愛上面。聖經當中關於神的預定與掌管的教導，一樣可以用來作為生活其它部份的指引。這就是將「世界觀」應用於「戀愛觀」。聖經給了我們一套整全的世界觀，因此，聖經對於「如何談戀愛」，是有許多指引的。

由此看來，(1) 聖經允許婚前自由戀愛，且自由戀愛可以蒙神喜悅；(2) 聖經賜給我們一套的世界觀作為信仰與生活的指引，我們必須用這些基本原則來談戀愛，才能在戀愛中蒙神喜悅。

後來，家父、家母在溫哥華東區找到一間非常「另類」的教會，招待人員堪稱「粗暴」，領詩同工用五音不全的嗓子嘶吼，詩班獻詩像農村團隊唱共產黨軍歌。但這教會有一種莫名的感染力，是我們這些從小在教會長大的人沒見過的。最令人嘖嘖稱奇的是牧師的講道。他當時信主不久，曾投身海外民運及科研，獲常春藤名校博士，為福音的緣故成為牧師。家父、家母在這間教會待了下來，我跟他們去參加了一次主日崇拜，從此就沒再離開過。大學畢業後，直接進入神學院，同時也開始在這間教會擔任教牧，一轉眼就是五年。現在我已離職，到英國讀博士，雖在外地固定聚會並成為另一間教會會友，但我至今仍未放棄溫哥華教會的會籍。每次回溫哥華，我仍固定在這間教會聚會。

我愛這間教會，不是因為她可愛。她的確有很可愛的地方──特別是其中的弟兄姊妹。但我十五年前就體會到教會是罪人聚集之處，而牧者往往是罪人中的罪魁。我自己成為教牧後，更深刻地體會到「牧者也是罪人」的道理。其實這不需要從經驗去學，聖經早就講得很清楚了，只不過罪人往往喜歡替自己造偶像。中國古代有皇權崇拜，近代有毛、蔣所帶領的造神運動，同樣一群罪人，來到教會後，就把牧師當成了神在地上的代表，又將教會當成伊甸園。會眾往往對教會、對牧師充滿浪漫的幻想。十五年前，我們曾幻想一個「白白撿來的恩典」，同工們未曾對牧者進行適當的監督，以致縱容他的團隊在教會內進行分裂。當同工覺察時，為時已晚。若我們當年好好研究聖經關於教會治理的教導，或可明白教會不該無條件信任主任牧師，因為牧師都是罪人。

我們若禱告求神使牧師不致犯罪，卻從不在實際行動上規勸、監督牧師，這豈不就像求神賜「日用的飲食」，卻不耕種、不烹飪，等著神從天上降餡餅？我們當年不懂聖經的道理，浪漫地幻想一個「白白撿來的恩典」，結果心愛的教會就煙消雲散了。兩派教牧在主日崇拜中相互指控，其內容並非全然憑空捏造；會眾對教會的愛，成了鬥爭者手中的工具。會眾愛教會，自然就會選擇站在他們認為正在保護教會的那一方，但事實上他們對內幕又了解多少？不了解內幕就選邊站，他們對教會的愛，就成了結黨者手中的利器。十五年前，「白白撿來的恩典」帶領一個教牧團隊在教會中呼風喚雨，許多人灰心離去，後來這團隊自己又分成了兩個黨派，醜陋的戲碼在教會中上演，那些愛教會卻不明白聖經教導的會眾隨之起舞，好好一間教會就散了。發生這種事情時，為何愛教會的人要選邊站、選擇信任其中一方？為何不趕緊勤讀聖經，信靠神的話語，明白神的心意？

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家母曾以「耶穌潔淨聖殿」為題材，說了一番發人深省的道理。耶穌潔淨聖殿時，殿中肯定有一群人是真敬畏神、跟隨耶穌的。但這些人大概無法理解耶穌的作為。看見牛羊跑了、鴿子飛了，他們會想：「我們還拿什麼獻祭？」他們會趕緊把這些鳥獸抓回來。桌子翻了，聖殿亂了，他們趕緊重新整理聖殿。其實聖殿當初成為賊窩，他們本來也不好受，但現在耶穌把聖殿給翻了，他們更感受到切身的痛。他們定睛於令人痛心的事上，痛到睡不著覺。

信心鐵則：當基督徒找不到安慰的時候，就代表他們目光注視於錯誤的目標。聖殿中那些愛教會的人，定睛於被耶穌掀翻的聖殿，而忽視了掀翻聖殿的耶穌。豈不知耶穌潔淨聖殿，是為了帶給我們安慰？我們是否看見耶穌愛教會到如此程度，不惜用最激烈的方法來潔淨教會？許多基督徒看見教會的問題，卻以「不可以卵擊石」為由姑息之；看見牧師出了問題，卻以為逆來順受是「生命的操練」；教牧間在不得已撕破臉前，極盡「遮掩」之能事，以為這就是「愛中合一」。感謝主，耶穌愛教會，不是這種愛法，所以我們可以放心地把教會交託在祂手中。祂是潔淨聖殿的主。

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不要忘記，我們信聖而公之教會，她是無形的教會。十五年前，可愛的小教會散了，弟兄姊妹各自去了不同教會。最近在Facebook上找到許多當年會友的孩子，跟我年紀差不多，除了我之外，還有一位成了傳道人，其他也都在各地繼續服事神。若當年心愛的小教會沒散，我今日又會在哪裡？有時候我們愛某間教會過於愛基督、信任某位牧者如同信靠神，這是神不喜悅的。若教會落入這樣的光景，那麼我們應該求耶穌來潔淨聖殿。若經歷耶穌潔淨聖殿的痛，我們就有得安慰的確據。

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我對自己教會的教導、治理有許多批評，也多次公開表述。教會中有些人很討厭我們牧師，會引用我的話來攻擊牧師。這些人時不時會想辦法接近我，但我始終與他們保持距離。他們反對的是牧師這個人；我反對的是他的一些教導及理念，以及治理教會的一些原則及方法。兩個禮拜前，好友的婚禮上，牧師滿面笑容與我握手，我霎時間感到一瞬熟悉的喜悅。誠然，他這個人也有許多令我感到難以相處的地方，我不會謊稱我喜歡他，坦白說，他許多理念及作為令我非常生氣難過，但我仍非常在乎他。我十七歲就來到他的教會，是在這裡長大的！婚禮上的證道，讓許多對他有成見的人感到他又在推銷自己教會，但我認為那是一篇非常精彩的道。事實上，就連在我與牧師關係最緊張時，有一次聽他一篇講道，我仍感動到流下眼淚。有些弟兄姊妹反對牧師這個「人」，所以他講出來的道，他們都聽不進去。許多人因為我對牧師在神學上作出一些公開批評，就支持我、喜歡我。我又不是共產黨！「敵人的敵人就是朋友」？少來！牧師不是我的敵人！「為牧師守望」及「與牧師為敵」只有一線之差，其距離正如撒但「捶胸頓足」及「手舞足蹈」之間的差異。

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耶穌愛教會，不是因為教會可愛。教會是罪人聚集的地方；教會不是靠聖潔的表象吸引人，而是靠基督的十字架。當教會發生醜陋的事時，許多人會被絆倒，也會有許多軟弱者因此得剛強。從前愛教會，是因為教會很溫暖，聚會感覺很聖潔，牧師講道發人深省。當教會上演醜陋的戲碼，溫暖不再，我們卻仍不放棄，繼續為她守望時，我們就稍體會到基督愛教會的心了。牧師雖然犯罪，我們卻仍陪伴他，以安慰、監督、責備、懲戒來支持他，而非姑息他的罪或對他暗中懷恨，那麼照著聖經的應許，「愛能遮掩許多的過犯」，這樣還有誰能控告我們呢？

第二代基督徒的流失，是許多教會面臨的問題。筆者牧養青少年的經歷中，看過不少基督徒家長因子女遠離神而擔憂流淚。令人欣慰的是，許多基督徒家長最關心的並非子女的學業、交友、事業，而是孩子的信仰。這些家長從子女年幼時就開始教導他們敬畏神，把孩子帶到教會，並在家中帶孩子操練「家庭祭壇」。到底問題出在哪裡？為什麼許多從小在敬虔家庭中長大的孩子，進入青春期後卻開始遠離神？就此問題，心理學家及教育學家提出許多意見，他們的貢獻毋庸置疑，但若不深思人的罪與神的恩典，恐怕這些專家的洞見只能治標而不治本。因此，我們必須以神的話語為出發點來討論這問題。本文所要提出的論點是：假如我們不讓孩子們看見「十字架討厭的地方」（加五11），那麼就別奢望他們能夠認識神、愛祂、敬畏祂。這論點似乎有些突兀──怎會有愛主的基督徒允許自己子女討厭神呢？

「十字架討厭的地方」
保羅講這句話時，是從割禮的爭議出發，與加拉太教會的猶太主義者辯論稱義的問題：究竟罪人被神稱義，是靠自己行出的義，還是因信與基督聯合而得著基督的義？在此保羅耐人尋味地說道，假如我們稱義是靠行律法，「那十字架討厭的地方就沒有了」。保羅問道，若十字架失去其令人討厭之處，基督的福音還值得使徒為其受逼迫嗎（11節）？可見，十字架討厭之處，也正是福音價值之所在。

問題是，十字架有何討厭之處？十字架冒犯的對象又是誰？「討厭的地方」一詞原文是skandalon，意思包括「冒犯」、「汙點」、「絆腳石」，是英文scandal（醜聞）的字源。保羅在羅九33及林前一23用這個字，稱釘十架的基督為猶太律法主義者的絆腳石。因此，十字架所冒犯的對象是那些想靠行為稱義的人。我們可能因此認為，凡信靠基督的人，就不會討厭十字架。

但我們若明白十字架何處令人討厭，恐怕就不會這樣想了。關於十字架的論述，教會史上鮮見比馬丁路德「十架神學」更深刻的省思，可惜本文篇幅有限，無法作完整的介紹。路德指出，十字架不但是律法主義者的絆腳石，更是神在基督裡對祂兒女的羞辱。神用基督的十字架讓祂兒女一次次看見自己是何等罪人，每次犯罪，就在基督身上多加一道釘痕。在十字架前，神的兒女一次次被剝去身上衣衫，變得赤身露體。但我們必須強調，這並非神的最終目的。神在十架蔭下剝去我們的襤褸衣衫，是為了用基督的寶血遮蓋我們。然而，儘管我們已被基督寶血遮蓋，十字架卻仍像一面鏡子，不斷照出我們罪人的本相。一方面我們知道基督的義已加給我們，另一方面我們卻更深刻地看見自己的罪性。十字架不斷羞辱我們，卻又不斷遮蓋我們的羞恥。我們討厭十字架，因為它使我們無法自我感覺良好。

正因我們罪惡的本性不斷與基督相抗，所以保羅提到「十字架討厭的地方」後，立即指出信徒今生的屬靈爭戰：「情慾和聖靈相爭，聖靈和情慾相爭，使你們不能做所願意做的」（加五17）。這節經文與羅七前後呼應，讓我們看見，我們與基督的聯合（參加二19-20），使我們無法完全放任自己的私慾，但我們的罪又使我們無法自由地活出基督加在我們身上的義。儘管我們已信了基督，在本性上卻仍與基督為敵。

保羅如此表達這種內在掙扎的心境：「我真是苦啊！」（羅七24） 然而，正如上述所言，十字架在信徒一生中所帶來的痛苦，並非神的最終目的。因此，保羅強調：「如今，那些在基督耶穌裡的就不定罪了」（羅八1）；「現在的苦楚若比起將來要顯於我們的榮耀，就不足介意了」（羅八18）。緊接著，保羅將這種內在爭扎的苦楚，與「患難」、「困苦」、「逼迫」、「飢餓」、「赤身露體」、「危險」、「刀劍」、死亡等外在苦難相提並論（羅八35-36）。內在的掙扎與外在的苦難，共通之處就在於神使「萬事都互相效力」──路德稱之為「神的工」（opus Dei）──皆發生於神的掌管之下。

這就產生一個問題：神若愛祂的兒女，為何讓祂兒女遭受這些內在的試探與外在的苦難？神是全能者，可以阻止這一切，但祂卻允許這一切發生。這是否代表神其實並不愛我們，不把我們當成祂兒女？

保羅對這項質疑的回答是：一切試探與苦難「都不能叫我們與神的愛隔絕；這愛是在我們的主基督耶穌裡的」（羅八39）。我們不知為何神讓我們失去許多珍愛的事物，包括心愛的人，但我們深知神「不愛惜自己的兒子為我們眾人捨了」（羅八32）。因此，希伯來書的作者提到了信徒所遭遇的種種苦難後，勸勉讀者要定睛「仰望為我們信心創始成終的耶穌」（來十二2）。換言之，上帝拒絕用其它方法為自己辯護；釘十架的基督，是神對這些疑難的惟一答案。

魯益師（C.S. Lewis）痛失愛妻後，在《卿卿如晤》（A Grief Observed）中將約伯的上帝比作一個反覆無常的小丑，毫無來由地打翻某人手中的一碗湯，只為了在下一刻將一模一樣的一碗湯賜給他。魯益師指天罵地一番，說道上帝如此可惡，若上帝有赦罪權柄，應該先赦免祂自己。但上帝並未赦免祂自己；祂走上了十字架。念及十字架，魯益師才開始重新找到平安。十字架是神的沉默、神的自我隱藏，正如魯益師所言，是神的「No Answer」，然而這是一種特殊的「No Answer」，好像一位慈父搖搖手，不是在拒絕孩子的問題，而是延遲祂的答案，似乎是在說：「孩子啊，平靜下來，你現在還無法明白。」信心並非建立在無法明白的事上；信心的基礎是我們確知的真理，即神藉著基督在十字架上向我們顯明的公義、慈愛、全能。

信心的主觀層面
所謂信心，就是如此定睛仰望耶穌基督，在基督裡確知公義全能的父神對我們的愛。魯益師在寫《返璞歸真》（Mere Christianity）時，精闢地探討基督教的客觀真理。然而，信心是對客觀真理的主觀回應。痛失愛妻後，上帝在魯益師的主觀認知上變成一個不可理喻的虐待狂，儘管魯益師承認，這種認知客觀上並不合理。

筆者發現，許多敬虔父母在教育子女時，非常強調聖經的客觀真理：神的存在、全能、良善等。這當然非常重要，然而，他們所謂「敬虔教育」，基本上就是告訴子女：「我們沒有理由不愛神。」的確，客觀上，我們沒有理由不愛神。

很可惜，我們經常忽略信心的主觀性，以致否認我們內心深處對神的一些負面認知與感受。客觀上，神是我們慈愛的父，但我們作為罪人，在主觀的認知上，常常會懷疑神對我們的愛。這不光是一種感覺；我們經常在理性上對上帝提出種種質疑，因為理性是墮落的。然而，我們不敢承認我們對神有種種負面的認知、感受；我們不敢正視自己的罪，因為我們不敢信靠神的恩典。我們骨子裡還是想靠行為稱義；我們以「敬虔」當作自我感覺良好的本錢。

保羅提到「十字架討厭的地方」，並不是指十字架本身很討厭，而是指罪人對十字架的主觀認知。就算我們實質上已經披戴基督的義，但我們終其一生在本性上仍是完全的罪人。因此，十字架會讓信徒一輩子討厭神。

假如我們從不討厭十字架，我們就從未真正認識神的恩典，也從未真正認識自己的罪；假如我們尚未學會討厭神，那麼我們對神的愛，永遠是表面而虛浮的。怎麼教導我們下一代去認識神、愛祂、敬畏祂？「十字架討厭的地方」就是關鍵。

很可惜，許多愛主的家長，從不給幼年子女懷疑神、討厭神的空間。有些孩子週日想參加朋友的派對，但他們必須上教會。他們可能到後來內心深處對教會產生反感，因為教會奪去了他們的快樂。但他們從小就學會否認。他們不敢去碰心裡那塊討厭神的地方，因為他們以為討厭神就是「不敬虔」，而他們所受的「敬虔教育」，就是要靠敬虔來肯定自己的價值。他們漸漸長大，不願再虛偽地否認內心的欲望時，就離開教會。

在理性上，許多孩子從小就學會否認自己對神的種種懷疑。很多主日學老師能夠回答孩子的疑問，但少有老師懂得幫助孩子看見自己疑問背後的罪性，更別說教導孩子坦然無懼地帶著自己的罪與疑問來到十架蔭下求答案。許多教會裡的孩子與神起衝突時，屬靈長輩總是替神辯護，直到有一天，孩子們找到這些辯護的漏洞時，就歡喜地認定自己是對的、神是錯的。我們以為替神辯護，就可守住孩子的信仰。

然而，信與不信的區別，不在於我們是否承認神是對的。真正的信徒，有時也會懷疑神；有名無實的基督徒，也會承認神的真理。真假信心的區別，在於一個人用什麼樣的態度來面對他與神的衝突：有真信心的人，總希望神是對的；假信的人，總希望自己是對的。同樣地，愛神與不愛神的人，同樣會討厭神，當然有時也會喜歡神（特別是生活順利的時候）。兩者的區別在於：愛神的人，發現自己討厭神時，心裡並不喜樂，內心深處會希望與神言歸於好；不愛神的人，會用心安理得的態度去討厭神。我們如何引導孩子愛神、信靠神？

結語
我們若不給孩子懷疑神、討厭神的空間，他們就學不會信靠神、愛神。聖經中充滿這樣的例子。以利亞擊敗巴力先知，以色列卻更加邪惡，因此以利亞對神充滿憤怒與不解。一番掙扎之後，以利亞終於在溫柔的微風中聽見神的聲音，也因此更認識神、更愛祂（參王上十九）。基督復活後，多馬用褻瀆的言語對基督復活的喜訊嗤之以鼻，這使得他在耶穌顯現時，戰兢敬畏地稱呼耶穌：「我的主、我的神。」（參約廿24-28）彼得三次不認主後，終於看見自己的罪性，也更深刻地認識基督的恩典，因此在耶穌復活後，他不以為恥地三次回答耶穌：「主，我愛祢」（參約十八、廿一）。

基督為何說「凡婦人所生的，沒有一個興起來大過施洗約翰的」？是因為約翰的信心堅定、永不軟弱嗎？不，耶穌說這話時，約翰正下在監裡，開始懷疑耶穌是否就是先知所應許的彌賽亞。但約翰懂得定睛仰望基督。他懷疑耶穌時，不用邏輯推理、經驗歸納，也不靠宗教情感，直接打發門徒去找耶穌，訴說他的疑惑（參太十一2-11）。

回到剛才的問題：我們怎樣引導孩子學習信心的功課？惟一的答案：定睛仰望基督十架討厭的地方，以坦然認識自己的罪，並被基督的恩典吸引。神知道我們是罪人，對祂充滿質疑，所以祂邀請我們：「你們來，我們彼此辯論。」（賽一18）我們準備了萬卷辯詞，一面控告神，一面準備在神面前自稱為義。但神並未替自己辯護，反而用十字架稱我們為義：「你們的罪雖像硃紅，必變成雪白。雖紅如丹顏，必白如羊毛。」這無非是神對想自稱為義的人最嚴重的冒犯，然而十字架討厭的地方，也正是神恩典最寶貴之處。藉由十字架認識神、認識自己的人，是真正信神、愛神的人，儘管他們仍會討厭、懷疑神。鼓勵我們的孩子跟神辯論吧。祂已經賜下主耶穌的十字架了！

Recently I touched upon the issue of ecumenism with a friend, and in our discussion I mentioned the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justificaiton (henceforth abbreviated as JD) of 1999 (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Declaration_on_the_Doctrine_of_Justification for a brief introduction). Here I will give a brief evaluation thereof. In order to appreciate the extent to which JD succeeds in representing the commonalities and differences between Lutherans and Catholics, I will begin by briefly comparing the doctrine of justification as presented by Luther and the Council of Trent.

Luther on Justification

At the heart of Luther’s doctrine of justification is the concept of participatio Christi, which serves as the basis of the “wondrous exchange” whereby our sins are imputed to Christ and Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us through faith. This imputation is not merely an external declaration, as if it were a legal fiction. Rather, “everyone who believes in [Christ] really has no sins, because they have been transferred to Christ” (Against Latomus, 200). For this reason, the believer is reckoned righteous. Note that Luther’s doctrine of justification is strongly monergistic: Even the faith by which sinners are justified is wrought in Christ’s person and communicated to us in union with Christ. For Luther, fallen humans are so depraved that they have nothing in and of themselves that may merit the grace of justification.

Several implications follow from this basic understanding of justification. First, while Christ’s righteousness is really communicated to the sinner, it always remains an alien righteousness wrought in and by the person and work of Christ. Second, it follows that the believer is already completely and really made righteous, and yet will ever remain a sinner in this life—simul justus et peccator. Third, since it is by the imputation of Christ’s perfect righteousness that the sinner is justified, no sin whatsoever committed by the believer may threaten his or her salvation. On this note, Luther does not distinguish between venial and mortal sin. For Luther, all sins are real and remain real after baptism, and without the wondrous exchange, no sinner may escape the wrath of God. This high view of sin underscores the significance of both justification and sanctification: “God saves real, not imaginary, sinners, and he teaches us to mortify real rather than imaginary sin” (Ibid., 229). According to Luther, justification and sanctification are two distinct but inseparable consequences of participatio Christi. Sanctification is the fruit and manifestation of justification—the real imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the sinner. As such sanctification depends on justification, and not vice versa. In this sense, we may conclude that in Luther’s understanding, justification, which is already complete in Christ alone, by grace alone and through faith alone, is both necessary and sufficient for the salvation of sinners.

The Council of Trent on Justification

By contrast, according to the Catholic view, justification, which remains incomplete during the present life, is necessary but insufficient for salvation: “Faith, co-operating with good works, increase in that justice which they have received through the grace of Christ, and are still further justified” (Ch. X). To be sure, justification is initially the work of God alone and cannot take place “without the grace of God through Jesus Christ” (Canon I). However, God “moves and excites” human free will such that it may “co-operate towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification” (Canon IV). It is in this synergistic sense that “faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation, and root of all Justification” (Ch. VIII). Note that the emphasis here falls on the necessity of faith for justification, but not its sufficiency. After baptism, the grace of justification is maintained by the love formed in the believer with divine help. Out of love, the believer obeys God’s commandments. However, the believer may also choose to disobey God and fall into sin, thereby losing the grace of justification: “For God forsakes not those who have been once justified by His grace, unless He be first forsaken by them” (Ch. XI). Therefore, on top of the sacrament of baptism that marks the beginning of justification by faith, Trent emphasizes the importance of the sacrament of penance that provides the possibility for the restoration of those who have “fallen from the received grace of Justification” (Ch. XIV). Furthermore, those who have fallen into venial sin may be restored, but those who have committed mortal sins will lose the grace of justification, even though their faith may remain, and to restore their justified status is highly difficult (Ch. XV). That is to say, faith is necessary for the initiation of justification, but is insufficient to sustain it. In addition, the merit of Christ is also necessary but insufficient for justification: Humans cannot be “just without the justice of Christ,” but it is not “by that justice itself that they are formally just” (Canon X); humans cannot be “justified… by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ… to the exclusion of the grace and charity which is… inherent in them” (Canon XI). That is to say, the righteousness of Christ imputed to the believer is insufficient for justification without love, which is the fruit of the Holy Spirit exercised by the believer’s free will. In sum, on the Catholic view, there are threefold necessities and insufficiencies in the doctrine of justification: 1. Faith is necessary for the initiation but insufficient for the sustention of justification; 2. Christ’s righteousness is necessary but insufficient for justification; and 3. the grace of justification is necessary but insufficient for salvation unto eternal life.

The Joint Declaration: Ambiguities on Necessity and Sufficiency

A striking feature of the JD is the Catholic consent to adopt the Reformation language of the solas. Does this indicate that the Catholics have moved away from Trent towards a monergistic understanding of justification? What do Catholics mean when they adopt the sola language? In an attempt to answer these questions, I will examine the ambiguities in the JD’s formulation of the necessity and sufficiency of Christ, grace and faith for salvation.

The first mention of the solas is in paragraph 15, which Cardinal Dulles calls “the heart of the Joint Declaration” (Dulles 2): “Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.” Note several ambiguities here. First and most important, this statement speaks of grace in terms of Christ’s work but says nothing about Christ’s person. This avoids the difficulty of having to deal with different understandings of participatio Christi. As we have seen, Luther’s understanding of our being in Christ makes Christ’s grace, wrought in and by Christ’s person and work, both necessary and sufficient for salvation. In comparison, according to Trent, the believer is joined with Christ in such a way that Christ “continually infuses his virtue” into the justified, so that in cooperation with Christ’s grace they may obtain eternal life. In this sense, for the Lutherans, “grace alone” means that grace is both necessary and sufficient for salvation, while for the Catholics, it means that grace is necessary but must be accompanied with human cooperation.

Second, this ambivalence is further suggested in the next part of the statement above, which denies that human merit plays any part when we are “accepted by God,” and emphasizes at the same time that once God has accepted us, we receive the Holy Spirit “who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.” Catholics who subscribe to Trent may well agree that our acceptance by God is “not because of any merit on our part” in the sense that justification is initiated by God, but they would emphasize that we cannot sustain our justification without good works. Protestants, however, would contend with Luther that Christ’s grace is sufficient for our salvation, and that good works are only the result and manifestation of our being in Christ.

Third, note that paragraph 15 of the JD consistently avoids mentioning whether grace is sufficient for salvation. The first sentence says that “justification is the work of the triune God” without mentioning whether it involves human cooperation. The third sentence says that Christ’s incarnation, death and resurrection are the “foundation and presupposition of justification,” implying that Christ’s grace is necessary for justification, but says nothing about its sufficiency.

Dulles comments on paragraph 15 that “by mentioning both faith and works, both acceptance by God and the gift of the Holy Spirit, this sentence strikes an even-handed balance calculated to satisfy both sides,” which “dispels some false stereotypes inherited from the past” (Dulles 2). Indeed, this paragraph helps to clarify that Lutherans are not antinomian. However, it is not true that “Lutherans have often accused Catholics of holding that justification is a human achievement rather than a divine gift received in faith” (Ibid., emphasis mine). The Reformation understands the Catholic doctrine of justification as synergism, that is, cooperation between God’s grace and human freedom. This Protestant understanding of Roman Catholicism, in the current analysis, has not been dispelled by the ambiguous statements in paragraph 15 of the JD, as it still leaves room for a synergistic interpretation of the doctrine of justification.

The next ambivalent usage of the sola language is found in paragraph 16: “Through Christ alone are we justified.” The preposition is again designed to avoid dealing with the heart of the dispute between Lutherans and Catholics, viz. participatio Christi. The Reformation would emphasize that we are justified in Christ, and it is our being in Christ that enables us to be justified by Christ and through Christ. That is to say, we are first united with Christ (in); in union with Christ He communicates His righteousness to us (by); by virtue of the alien righteousness which is really made ours in Christ, God declares that we are righteous (through). Note that this external declaration has its basis in the real imputation of righteousness, and as such it is not a legal fiction. This view of justification, as we have seen, excludes any synergistic interpretation.

However, when the JD employs only one preposition (through), it leaves room for the Catholics to interpret solus Christus as merely the “meritorious cause” of justification, which is necessary for salvation but insufficient without human good works as a result of the “infusion” of “faith, hope, and charity” “through Christ” (Trent Ch. VII).

Finally, on the third sola, Catholics are unable to confess with the Lutherans that justification is by faith alone. In paragraph 25, Catholics and Lutherans “confess together that sinners are justified by faith.” Paragraph 26, which expounds the Lutheran view, says that “God justifies sinners in faith alone,” while paragraph 27 says that “the Catholic understanding also sees faith as fundamental in justification.” These paragraphs suggest that Catholics and Lutherans agree upon the necessity of faith in justification, but whereas Lutherans see faith, which is part and parcel of the grace communicated to us in union with Christ, as a sufficient condition for justification, Catholics would contend that faith is insufficient to retain justification. That is to say, for Lutherans, one whose faith is true will never lose the grace of justification, while for Catholics, one may retain one’s faith but still lose the grace of justification.

Conclusion

In sum, the Reformation understands justification as Christ’s perfect righteousness imputed to us in our union with Christ, and once imputed, we are in need of no further justification, even though our sins remain real and have yet to be extinguished. Roman Catholicism understands justification as an ongoing process initiated by God’s grace through Christ on the basis of our faith, which must be sustained by human cooperation with divine grace. The heart of the dispute, then, is whether and how one treats the doctrine of justification on the basis of participatio Christi. In the current analysis, the JD is far from having settled the dispute, because it has consistently avoided the heart of the dispute. This intentional ambiguity may be taken as a sign of good will on both sides, whereby a genuine desire for ecumenical unity is made apparent. Dulles is correct in stating that the different thought-forms and languages reflect real doctrinal differences between Lutherans and Catholics. In outlining these doctrinal differences, however, Dulles could have taken one step further to identify the heart of dispute as discussed above. It is doubtful whether pretending that Lutherans—and mainstream Evangelicals for that matter—and Catholics are in agreement on the doctrine of justification is the right way to further the cause of ecumenical unity.

WORKS CITED

Dulles, Avery. “Two Languages of Salvation: The Lutheran-Catholic Joint Declaration.” First Things 98 (1999): 25-30.

Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. [On-line] available at: http://archive.elca.org/ecumenical/ecumenicaldialogue/romancatholic/jddj/index.html

Luther, Martin. Against Latomus in Works 32. Ed. George W. Forell, Helmut T. Lehmann. Trans. George Lindbeck. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1958.

Schaff, Philip, ed. “The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent,” “Sixth Session: On Justification.” The Creeds of Christendom 2. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983.